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zelius case, while perhaps rendered futile, at least was not made
impossible, as in the Pickett case. The defendant was guilty of no
more than a qualified repudiation. Moreover, plaintiff could not
point in the Corzelius case, to the fact of the defendant's breach
as a possible foundation for a presumption that the condition
would have been performed, for the defendant's breach in the
case was not, as in the Pickett case, an actual accomplishment of
the object of the condition.
What, then, is the present Texas law on the point under con-
sideration, as a result of the Corzelius and Pickett decisions? Prob-
ably the safest conclusion, in the light of all of the authorities con-
sidered, is that, as a general rule, the plaintiff must prove that a
condition, alleged to have been excused by defendant's repudia-
tion, would, in the absence of such repudiation, have been ful-
filled; the Pickett case is probably an exception, confined to cases
where the defendant has accomplished the result which the condi-
tion contemplated and has rendered impossible performance by
the plaintiff. Robert R. Sanford.
CORPORATIONS
ACQUISITION BY DIRECTORS OF OUTSTANDING CLAIMS
AGAINST CORPORATION
Arkansas. In Mothershead v. Douglas et a1' a corporation owned
a debt in the amount of $45,000 secured by a mortgage. The cor-
poration was unable to pay the debt, and the creditor agreed to
accept $15,000 in settlement. Acting in a formal meeting, the di-
rectors had the corporation execute a new sixty-day note and mort-
gage for the original indebtedness of $45,000 to several of the
corporation's directors who personally advanced the $15,000.
Upon maturity of this note, the lending directors sued to foreclose
the mortgage, and the property secured by the mortgage brought
,- Ark.-, 221 S. W. 2d. 424 (1949).
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$42,500 at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiff, a stockholder, inter-
vened. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the lending directors
had no claim against the corporation beyond the amount actually
advanced by them. The court stated the general rule to be that a
director of a corporation will not be permitted to acquire a claim
against the corporation either when he owes it a duty of acting in
its behalf and for its benefit, or when, knowing the corporation to
be insolvent, he buys a claim for his own benefit, intending thereby
to get an advantage over other creditors. The director has, in this
situation, no claim against the corporation beyond the amount
actually expended by him.
The Mothershead case is in accord with the general view of the
courts concerning acquisition of corporate claims by directors.2
Language used in the case indicates that the directors are "trus-
tees" in handling corporate affairs. Under strict trust law, it has
long been settled that a trustee cannot acquire obligations of the
trust estate at a discount and enforce them at their face value.8
However, courts usually recognize commercial interests in the
ready transferability of corporate obligations and do not apply the
strict trust rule to directors and officers of a corporation.'
Apparently the corporation was insolvent at least to the extent
that it could not meet its obligations as they matured; this factor
of insolvency alone is probably enough to cause most courts to
limit the amount of recovery by a director to that actually ex-
pended by him in acquiring the claim.' If it is for the interest of
the corporation to take up its obligations at a discount, and it is
financially able to do so, a director should not be permitted to buy
2 Homer v. New South Oil Mill, 130 Ark. 551, 197 S. W. 1163 (1917) ; Boney v.
Tilley, 109 Cal. 346. 42 Pac. 439 (1895); Young v. Columbia Land and Investment
Co., 53 Ore. 438, 99 Pac. 936, 101 Pac. 212, 133 Am. St. Rep. 844 (1909).
3 Jose v. Lyman, 316 Mass. 271. 55 N. E. 2d. 833 (1944).
4 Inglehart v. Thousand Island Hotel Co., 32 Hun. 377 (N. Y. App. Div. 4th Dept.
1884) ; McIntyre v. Ajax Mining Co., 28 Utah 162, 77 Pao. 613 (1904).
5 Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F. 2d. 725 (C.C.A. 10th, 1943) ; In re Philadelphia and
Western Ry. Co., 64 F. Supp. 738 (Dist. Ct. E. D. Pa. 1946); In re McCrory Stores
Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (Dist. Ct. S. D. N. Y. 1935); Davis v. Rock Creek Lumber,
Flume and Mining Co., 55 Cal. 539, 36 Am. Rep. 40 (1880).
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the obligations at a discount and enforce them in full without first
offering the opportunity to the corporation.' In the Mothershead
case an offer apparently was made first to the corporation, since a
formal directors' meeting was called which authorized the liquida-
tion of the claim by the lending directors.
Although not discussed by the court, the record seems to indicate
that this particular directors' meeting was subject to the applica-
tion of the generally accepted "interested directors" rule to the
effect that a contract authorized on behalf of a corporation is void-
able unless there is a disinterested quorum and a voting majority
and the director successfully bears the burden of showing the
fairness of the transaction.' Four directors were present at the
meeting, and three of them were promisees in the note and mort-
gage.
The principle used by some courts' to the effect that a director
may become a creditor of a corporation and enforce his claims
by the same methods as any other creditor but that the contract by
which he became a creditor is subject to the strictest scrutiny and
will be enforced only when fair and equitable is probably as pre-
cise a statement as is possible. This generalization recognizes
desirable commercial elasticity and at the same time prevents
exploitation by a director of his fiduciary position. In the Mothers.
head case the fact that the property brought a much greater amount
on the foreclosure sale than the amount advanced by the directors
and the further fact that the note and mortgage were only for a
sixty-day period undoubtedly would have their influence on the
court in applying the above principle.
DISPOSAL OF LEASE AND OPTION ASSETS UPON
DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATION
Texas. In Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons9 the Texas Supreme
Court had before it a suit for specific performance of an option to
6 Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 M. 301, 40 N. E. 362 (1895).
7 McKittrick v. Ark. Cent. Ry. Co.. 152 U. S. 473 (1894).
8 Coombs v. Barker, 31 Mont. 526, 79 Pac. 1 (1905).
p147 Tex. 608. 218 S. W. 2d. 451 (1949).
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purchase a business building. Plantiffs were the directors of a les-
see corporation. At the time of the suit, although a certificate of
dissolution had been issued by the Secretary of State, 10 the direc-
tors had not completed the liquidation, winding up, and distribu-
tion of corporate assets to the stockholders. The terms of the lease
provided that it was non-assignable, but that the lessee had an
option to purchase the building at any time during the life of the
lease. The directors of the dissolved corporation notified defendant
that the corporation desired to exercise the option to purchase the
building, and after a few preliminary negotiations the defendant
refused to sell. The present suit for specific performance resulted.
Defendant lessor contended that Articles 1359, 1388, and 1389
of the TEXAS REVISED CIVIL STATUTES (VERNON, 1925) prevented
the exercise of the option to purchase. The court, however, granted
specific performance.
The proper determination of the issues in this case requires an
inquiry into the power and authority of the directors and managers
of a dissolved corporation, keeping in mind restrictions in the
lease contract between the lessor and lessee. In order to determine
that power and authority reference must be had to Article 1388,
which delineates the permissible power. The portion of the statute
which is relevant gives the directors and managers power to (1)
settle the affairs, (2) collect the outstanding debts, (3) divide the
moneys and other property among the stockholders, and (4) exer-
cise full power and authority of said company over such assets and
property. Article 1389 continues the existence of the corporation
for three years in order that the corporation may settle up its
affairs.
At common law, dissolution of the corporation was regarded as
the death of a fictitious person; corporate realty reverted to the
grantor and personalty escheated to the state." As noted in the
10 Tx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1387-4 provides: "When, without a
stockholders' meeting, all the stockholders of the corporation consent in writing to
a dissolution, the same shall be certified to as above and filed with the Secretary of
State. ..."
11 47 A.L.R. 1288 (1927).
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Nardis case, Texas courts, even in absence of statutory authority,
adhered to the doctrine that all the assets of a dissolved corpora-
tion are protected by equity as a trust fund for creditors and stock-
holders.
In McBride v. Clayton12 the Texas Commission of Appeals held
that a dissolved retail merchandising corporation could not enforce
an insurance policy on the life of its former president, who had no
duties to perform in the dissolved corporation's affairs, since the
corporation had no "insurable interest" in the life of its inactive
former president. The commission of appeals construed Articles
1388 and 1389 to limit the powers of the directors of a dissolved
corporation strictly to those purposes set out in the statutes. The
commission said:
"Although the statutes give McBride Inc. a continued existence for as
long as three years after the surrender of its charter, it clearly could
not be so continued to purchase and sell goods, wares, and merchan-
dise and to transact a general retail mercantile business.""3 (Italics
by the court.)
Thus, it would appear that the transaction of any business in
furtherance of the purpose for which the corporate charter had
been granted other than for settling up its affairs is beyond the
scope of the directors' powers. It has long been the rule in Texas
that contract rights based upon valuable consideration will survive
dissolution for the benefit of the stockholders. 4 Apparently, then,
a dissolved corporation may enforce any contractual asset which
is in existence at the time of dissolution even though such enforce-
ment would involve the acquisition and subsequent disposition of
real or personal property. One of the defendant's contentions in
the Nardis case was lack of consideration for the option to pur-
chase; the court of civil appeals overruled this contention, holding
12 140 Tex. 71. 166 S. W. 2d. 125 (1942). The opinion of the commission of appeals
was adopted by the supreme court.
is Id. at 75. 166 S. W. at 128.
14 International and Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 75 Tex. 356, 12 S. W. 685
(1889) ; Sulphur Springs and Mt.: Pleasant Ry. Co. v. St. Louis A. & T. Ry. Co., 2 Tex.
Civ. App. 650, 22 S. W. 107 (1893), writ of error refused.
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that the obligation to pay rent was adequate consideration. 1" It ap-
pears that if an option to purchase is not supported by valuable
consideration, it is a mere offer to sell. In light of the limitation
on the powers of a dissolved corporation, an acceptance of an offer
to sell would probably be construed as transaction of new busi-
ness and thus unauthorized, since it would not seem to fall within
the language of the statute as "settling the affairs" or of exercising
"full power and authority" over assets and property. Judicial
interpretation of the statute has been rather meager. It is at least
questionable whether a third person can challenge the existence
of a dissolved corporation during the three-year term provided
for in Article 1389. It provides that the existence of every cor-
poration may be continued for three years after its dissolution
from whatever cause for the purpose of enabling those charged
with the duty to settle up its affairs. Since the existence of the cor-
poration is continued, it is possible that as to third persons there
has been no dissolution sufficient to affect the obligations due the
corporation and that corporate limited liability continues for that
three-year period.
The directors of a dissolved corporation are entitled to the use
of discretion in liquidating the corporate assets.'6 In the principal
case the directors had a choice of either paying the balance due of
approximately $19,000 on the unexpired portion of the lease
or exercising the option to purchase for $75,000. This exercise
of discretion by the directors was apparently justified.
American courts have held that a lease to a corporation is not
terminated by dissolution of the corporation whether the dissolu-
tion be voluntary" or involuntary." In a New Hampshire case19
an option to purchase contained in a non-assignable lease was en-
15 Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 213 S. W. 2d. (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
16 Tenison v. Wilson, 151 S. W. 2d. 327 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941), writ of error dis-
missed.
IT Kalkhoff v. Nelson. 60 Minn. 284. 62 N. W. 332 (1895).
18 People v. St. Nicholas Bank. 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897).
19 Conn v. Manchester Amusement Co.. 79 N. H. 450, 111 Ad. 339 (1920).
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forced; however, that case is distinguishable since the dissolution
was by legislative act and not voluntary as in the principal case.
In view of the holding of the Texas Supreme Court, a lessor who
desires to avoid the exercise of an option to purchase should clearly
provide in the lease contract that neither the lease nor option shall
survive corporate dissolution, whether the dissolution be voluntary
or involuntary. Without restrictive clauses in the lease contract,
even if no actual assignment is made by the dissolved corporation,
under the language of the statute, the directors may "divide the
moneys and other property among the stockholders." Thus, there
is nothing in the statute which would prohibit the directors from
exercising the option and leaving the stockholders as tenants in
common of the newly-acquired property. The theory of dissolution
is that the associated individuals still own all of the property
but do so as tenants in common without the attributes provided by
the corporation laws; apparently the only rights which are lost
upon dissolution are the privileges and rights peculiar to corpo-
rations. Since there is no requirement in the Texas statutes that
the assets be reduced to cash, the stockholders probably can be-
come and remain tenants in common of the unexpired lease term
and enforce that right as well as exercise the option to purchase,
unless the lease contains restrictions to the contrary.2
In the Nardis case defendant claimed that the dissolved corpo-
ration could not exercise the option to purchase, since it would
violate Article 1359, which in essence limits the acquisition of
land by a Texas corporation to those lands necessary to enable
the corporation to do business or to secure an indebtedness due
the corporation. The court of civil appeals held that this article
had no application to dissolved corporations. The supreme court
quoted the article but did not discuss the point. In previous Texas
decisions this article has been construed as being applicable only
to suits instituted by the State.21 The court of civil appeals opinion
20 Cummington Realty Associates v. Whitten, 239 Mass. 313, 132 N. E. 53 (1921).
21 Atlas Petroleum Corp. v. G. H. and S. A. Ry. Co., 5 S. W. 2d. 215 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928); Knowles v. Northern Texas Traction Co., 121 S. W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App.
1909); Ray v. Foster, 53 S. W. 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
